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"Unlawful Combatants"
in the United States
Drawing the Fine Line
Between Law and War
By Daniel Kanstroom
Anything that comes up in the Background detained as a "material witness." For rea-
United States tends to be looked at Jose Padilla, a native-born U.S. citi- sons that remain unclear, on June 9, 2002
as a law enforcement matter, '... zen, allegedly reentered the United he was designated by President Bush as
decide whether or not he's guilty
or innocent and give him due States from Afghanistan pursuant to a an "enemy combatant" and sent to
process.' Of course if ... you've plot to detonate a radioactive naval brig in South Carolina, where
got the risk of terroriss.. 1 killing bomb. A Chicago gang member he has been detained incommuni-
thousands or tens of thousands oa
people, you're not terribly interest-
ed in whether or not the person is access to counsel. Yaser Hamdi
potentially a subject for law was seized while
efrcement. fgtn
Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Tom
Brune & John Riley, Taking Liberties;
Collateral Damage, NEWSDAY, Sept.
15, 2002, at A3.
once convicted of mur-
May the U.S. government lawfully der, Padilla had allegedly
incarcerate a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil converted to Islam in
for an indeterminate period in solitary prison, moved to
confinement without providing the fol- Egypt, changed his
lowing rights: legal process, disclosure name to
of evidence, access to counsel, family Abdullah al
visitation, and judicial review? Before Muhajir,
September 11, 2001, most Americans and,
might have thought the question absurd,
but this is the reality faced by Jose
Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi, due to for the Taliban in
their having been designated by the Afghanistan and was
executive branch as "unlawful [or transferred from the U.S.
"enemy"] combatants." Like other base at Guantanamo Bay to
aspects of enforcement after the the Norfolk Naval Station brig after
September 11 attacks--secret removal authorities discovered he was a U.S. cit-
proceedings and unprecedented use of izen born in Louisiana.
material witness warrants, for example- according The U.S. government has argued
their cases provoke and demand to government that, as "unlawful combatants," both
answers to a series of fundamental and sources, met with Al Qaeda members. men should continue to be detained in





of war," which would mean they have
no rights as criminal defendants or, for
that matter, as civil detainees under the
U.S. Constitution. This precludes rights
to due process, counsel, bail, or a
speedy trial and leaves them caught in a
shadowy post-September 11 no-man's
land, awaiting resolution of their cases
by courts before which they have never
appeared, represented by lawyers with
whom they have never spoken.
Fortunately, the U.S. rule of law is
not so easily evaded as some members
of the administration might wish. Both
men's cases are currently under consid-
eration by federal courts pursuant to
writs of habeas corpus, Hamdi's before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Virginia and Padilla's before
the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The specific issues
in both cases are whether the men are
entitled to counsel and what information
the government must disclose, to whom,
about its determination of each man's
status as an unlawful combatant.
In Padilla v. Bush, No. 02
Civ. 4445 (MBM) (S.D.N.Y.), the
government has relied upon a classified
document that has not been given to
Padilla's lawyers, although it released
an unclassified version and apparently
has urged the court to review the clas-
sified version. Padilla's lawyers have
argued that the court should not base a
decision on either version of the docu-
ment until counsel are allowed to con-
sult with their client and hear his
response. As they wrote in their brief,
"Jose Padilla should be granted the fun-
damental right to have his voice heard
by this court." Such statements raise the
fundamental question whether, as a cit-
izen, he retains such a right, or his
unlawful- combatant status-as deter-
mined by the government-deprives
him of the panoply of constitutional
protections available to U.S. citizens
(or to any person detained within the
United States by the government).
What Is an "Unlawful Combatant"?
The general rule of U.S. law has long
been that civilian courts have jurisdic-
tion over citizens detained by the mili-
tary. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866) (a citizen arrested during
Civil War for "holding communication
with the enemy," "conspiring to seize
munitions ... [and] liberate prisoners of
war," and inciting rebellion could not be
tried by military courts, so long as civil-
ian courts were open. This principle was
reiterated in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946), which involved
two trials of ordinary offenses in military
courts in Hawaii during World
War II, while civilian courts
were open. The governmentsought to distinguish
Milligan because Hawaii was near the
active theater of war and under threat of
invasion, but the Court reversed both
convictions.
The possibility of an exception to
Milligan for "unlawful combatants"
derives from Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942), and the interstices of internation-
al law. Quirin dealt with a military com-
mission trial of Nazi saboteurs, one of
whom was a U.S. citizen. The Supreme
Court held that certain enemy belliger-
ents--specifically those who "without
uniform come secretly through the lines
for the purpose of waging war"-may be
detained without constitutional protec-
tions even if they are U.S. citizens:
[T]he law of war draws a distinc-
tion between . .., lawful and
unlawful combatants. Lawful
combatants are subject to capture
and detention as prisoners of war
by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention,
but in addition they are subject to
trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render
their belligerency unlawful.
This distinction may also be found with-
in the structures of international law, partic-
ularly the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The
Geneva Conventions state that members of
armed forces (such as A Qaeda) qualify for
prisoner of war status if they meet four cri-
teria: (1) being commanded by a person
responsible for subordinates; (2) having a
fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a dis-
tance; (3) carrying arms openly; and (4)
conducting operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war. Although it
seems likely that Al Qaeda fighters would
fail the last three criteria, the question-
potentially relevant to Hamdi--whether
Taliban fighters should qualify as lawful
combatants is a closer one. It should be
noted, in any case, that Article 5 of the
Third Geneva Convention requires that a
tribunal determine whether a person is
entitled to POW or even civilian status.
Thus, every captured individual should be
presumed a prisoner of war until deter-
mined otherwise by a competent tribunal.
Any person can theoretically be tried
for war crimes, but those given POW
status cannot be criminally tried for vio-
lent acts committed in battle. Some
"unlawful combatants" could face trial
by military tribunals, but the Bush
Military Order of November 13, 2001,
exempts U.S. citizens, which indicates
that Padilla and Hamdi would end up in
the civilian criminal justice system, as
happened with John Walker Lindh.
Other distinctions between POW
and unlawful combatant status involve
the protections against forced interroga-
tion and harsh detention conditions.
Torture is prohibited against anyone
under international and U.S. law, but
POWs are more specifically protected
than unlawful combatants against physi-
cal coercion and intensive interrogation.
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Thus, unlawful combatants could face
unmediated and unsupervised interro-
gation and be denied access to coun-
sel, family, or virtually any nonmilitary
personnel (with only the possible
exception of the International
Committee of the Red Cross). Further,
Article 118 of the Convention requires
that prisoners of war be "repatriated
without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities," but the administra-
tion may well believe some of its cap-
tives are too dangerous ever to be
released. So long as Al Qaeda and its
supporters exist, will the U.S. govern-
ment agree there has been, in the
words of the Geneva Conventions, a
"cessation of active hostilities"?
The Role of the Judicial Branch
Textual constitutional authority for a
meaningful judicial role begins with the
Suspension Clause of the Constitution,
which explicitly states that "the privi-
lege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the pub-
lic Safety may require it." Courts have
long construed this provision to main-
tain habeas review, even during times
of declared war.
In Quinn the defendants had their
status as "unlawful combatants" deter-
mined by a properly formed military
commission expressly authorized by
statute. The defendants had access to
counsel throughout the proceedings
and were ultimately able to seek judi-
cial review of the findings of the com-
mission. Quirin thus stands for the
proposition that civilian courts should
not, at the very least, categorically
decline to review habeas cases where
the government alleges that a person is
an "unlawful" or "enemy" combatant.
The question of the proper scope of
judicial review still remains open,
however. Shortly after September 11,
Congress authorized the president to
use all necessary and appropriate
force against "nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks [or] harbored such
organizations or persons."
Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001). The Fourth Circuit consid-
ered this authorization and the fact
that the Hamdi case arose
in the context of foreign relations
and national security, where a
court's deference to the political
branches of our nationa govern-
ment is considerable [and the
president wields] delicate, plena-
ry and exclusive power ... as the
sole organ of the federal govern-
ment in the field of international
relations-a power which does
not require as a basis for its exer-
cise an act of Congress.
The court concluded that the presi-
dent was acting in this case with statu-
tory authorization from Congress, and
that judicial deference extends to mili-
tary designations of individuals as
enemy combatants in times of active
hostilities, as well as to their detention
after capture on the field of battle.
In the context of long-term detention
of noncitizens, however, the Supreme
Court recently stated:
ITIhe Constitution may well pre-
clude granting an administrative
body the unreviewable authority
to make determinations implicat-
ing fundamental rights ... The
serious constitutional problem
arising out of a statute that, in
these circumstances, permits an
indefinite, perhaps permanent,
deprivation of human liberty
without any such protection is
obvious.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
692 (2001).
Hamdi and Padilla, however, have
not yet had the benefit of a status deter-
mination by any competent tribunal,
military or otherwise.
Rights of Unlawful Combatants
The fundamental questions at issue
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278
(4th Cir. 2002), could not be more pro-
found. Litigation up to the end of 2002
has centered on the rights of unlawful
combatants to counsel and release. The
government has stated that "enemy
combatants who are captured and
detained on the battlefield in a foreign
land" have "no general right under the
laws and customs of war, or the
Constitution ... to meet with counsel
concerning their detention, much less
to meet with counsel in private, without
military authorities present."
On May 10, 2002, the federal public
defender for the Eastern District of
Virginia filed a habeas corpus petition
challenging the government's detention
of Hamdi, naming Hamdi and himself
as next friend as petitioners and seeking
(1) "private and unmonitored communi-
cations" between the detainee and his
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counsel; (2) an end to all interrogations;
and (3) the release of Hamdi from
"Respondents' unlawful custody." The
district court held that Hamdi must be
allowed to meet with his attorney
because of "fundamental justice provid-
ed under the Constitution of the United
States." (Although there is general
agreement that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel would not apply to a
formally uncharged "unlawful combat-
ant.") The court specified that this meet-
ing was to be private, with only Hamdi,
the attorney, and the interpreter present;
without military personnel; and free
from listening or recording devices of
any kind.
The United States quickly filed a
motion for stay pending appeal of the
district court's unmonitored-access
order, and the Fourth Circuit granted
the stay. In the meantime, Hamdi's
father filed a separate petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, although he did not
request that counsel be granted
unmonitored access to his son. The dis-
trict court granted the petition in part,
and the United States again appealed.
At this point, the Fourth Circuit began
to consider the hard constitutional
questions presented by Hamdi's case
and remanded for development of a
fuller record.
Hamdi's public defender has
argued that "no evidence has been
submitted to support" Hamdi's status
as an enemy combatant and that
Hamdi, as a U.S. citizen detained in
the United States, is entitled to consti-
tutional protections, including unmoni-
tored access to counsel. The Fourth
Circuit, without specifying a precise
standard, decided the district court had
not adequately addressed these funda-
mental questions. The court did, how-
ever, reject the invitation of the gov-
ernment to dismiss the petition in its
entirety based on the argument that
"given the constitutionally limited role
of the courts in reviewing military
decisions, courts may not second-
guess the military's determination that
an individual is an enemy combatant
and should be detained as such." The
government, in short, asserted that its
determinations "are the first and final
word." Hamdi at 283. Fortunately, the
court declined to embrace so sweep-
ing a proposition that any U.S. citizen
alleged to be an enemy combatant
could be detained indefinitely without
charges or counsel on the govern-
ment's say-so, with no meaningful
judicial review.
It seems the government has retreat-
ed from an extreme position, albeit
tasked with confronting assertions of
executive authority within the United
States that would have been almost
unthinkable a short time ago. Perhaps
our courts should recall the admonition
in Milligan, written in the aftermath of
the Civil War: "The Constitution of the
United States, is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances."
Daniel Kanstroom is an associate clinical
professor and director of the Boston
College Immigration andAsylum Project
in Massachusetts.
slightly, as the litigation has progressed.
The government sought to file an ex
parte supplemental declaration that, it
said, would discuss "the military's deter-
mination to detain petitioner Hamdi as
an enemy combatant." The district
court, after hearing the government's
evidence, found it insufficient to estab-
lish such status because it failed to sub-
stantiate the primary witness's authority
to make such determinations for the
executive, to specify the nature of
Hamdi's alleged affiliation with the
Taliban, or to include almost all of the
specific evidence on which its conclu-
sions rested. The district court then
ordered the government to produce fur-
ther information (for review in camera)
to support the designation of Hamdi as
"enemy combatant" and to explain why
he must be held incommunicado.
Padilla's case, though not as far
along as that of Hamdi, seems likely to
raise similar issues. Most recently, on
December 4, 2002, U.S. Dictrict Judge
Michael Mukasey ruled that Padilla has
the right to challenge his detention in
court and, therefore, to consult with
counsel. It appears certain that the gov-
ernment will appeal this ruling, as it did
in Hamdi's case. The judge has not yet
decided, however, whether there is
enough evidence to support the admin-
istration's finding that Padilla is an
"unlawful combatant."
Conclusion
In a recent case brought by the
Detroit Free Press against John Ashcroft,
303 .3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), the court
stated, "Democracies die behind closed
doors." Our judicial system now seems
Human Rights
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continued from page 2
The United States should adopt a
policy of being a friend who shares its
legendary resources and wealth with the
800 million persons in the global village
who are chronically malnourished. The
nation needs a new foreign policy that
lives up to the ideals of human rights
proclaimed in the United Nations
Charter. The United States and all of the
190 nations of the earth pledged in
Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter
that they would help one another attain
the newly recognized political and eco-
nomic rights that now constitute the
public morality of the world. This cannot
be done so long as the United States
relies almost exclusively on its military
prowess for its foreign policy. Lawyers of
America have to act as moral architects
who will restrain the impetuous policies
of the government that teach that vio-
lence, armed conflict, and military
might can solve the moral, spiritual, and
human problems that overwhelm much
of humanity.
Robert F Drinan, 5.)., is aprofessor at
Georgetown University Law Center in
Washington, D.C., and a former member
of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Debate over
War Powers
continued from page 7
its arguments moved from the idea that
Iraq was somehow behind the terrorist
attacks; to a declaration that Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea constituted an "Axis of
Evil"; to a general justification based on
Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) and its animosity to the
United States; and finally to a moral
imperative. Only after the Security
Council took up the debate did the
administration take a position that Iraq
must be disarmed. Despite the shifting
rationalizations, the administration's goal
has remained the same: the United
States will use all means necessary to
depose Saddam Hussein. And yet,
despite the obvious lack of an instant
and overwhelming threat, the adminis-
tration claimed for nearly a year that it
did not need congressional authorization
for such a war. Moreover, even as the
president signed the Joint Resolution, his
press secretary maintained that the
authorization was unnecessary.
Constitutionally, the president has
the unilateral authority to commit U.S.
troops to Iraq or another rogue state
under the newly promulgated preemp-
tion policy of the National Security
Strategy only if he can show that such
an action constitutes response to a sud-
den or imminent attack. The administra-
tion has provided no evidence that Iraq
had invaded or intends to invade the
United States (i.e., as a sponsor of
September 11), let alone that it will do
so imminently. Absent such evidence,
congressional approval is needed. This
conclusion is based upon the following
three points:
First, the scale of military action nec-
essary to force a regime change in Iraq
(or any relatively stable state) strongly
suggests the action would be a "war" as
defined by the Constitution. In the most
recent judicial opinion on the subject,
Dellums v. Bush, a federal district court
found "no hesitation in concluding that
an offensive entry into Iraq by several
hundred thousand United States ser-
vicemen ... could be described as a
'war' within the meaning of [the War
Powers Clause]." Dellums v. Bush, 725
F, Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). Congress
would more likely acquiesce to unilat-
eral executive decisions involving rela-
tively small forces, but it cannot waive
its constitutional war powers.
Deployment of 200,000 or more
troops (or, even a smaller force deploy-
ment in conjunction with a massive
aerial assault), as the Pentagon has
proposed, is practically and qualitatively
different from the scale of other recent
U.S. military interventions, except for the
Vietnam and Gulf Wars (for which the
president specifically sought and
received congressional authorization).
Second, invading Iraq to effect a
regime change is clearly not an exam-
ple of repelling a sudden or imminent
attack. At least since 1993 when Iraq
may have attempted to assassinate for-
mer President Bush, Saddam Hussein
has neither used force against or direct-
ly threatened the United States or its
vital interests (aside from attacks on
allied aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones
above Iraq). According to National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, any
threat that Iraq poses is not of an imme-
diate nature; if it were, the president
already would have acted. Thus, charac-
terizing an invasion of Iraq as repelling
a sudden or imminent attack under
these circumstances dangerously dis-
torts the Founders' intent to limit the
Executive's authority.
Third, time limitations help to clarify
the boundary between executive and
legislative war powers with regard to
repelling "sudden attack." The president
has the authority and obligation to repel
sudden attacks because there is no time
to deliberate, and an individual can act
faster than Congress. A president who
feared rejection of war plans might not
want them subjected to congressional
scrutiny, but that decision does not
belong solely to the president.
National Security Strategy
The administration has made clear
that Iraq may not be its only target. On
September 20, 2002, the president
issued the National Security Strategy,
which proclaims that in order to "fore-
stall or prevent ... hostile acts by our
adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary act preemptively.... [l1n an
age where the enemies of civilization
openly and actively seek the world's
most destructive technologies, the
United States cannot remain idle where
dangers gather."
Under the doctrine of preemption,
the administration claims the right to
launch wars to prevent harm to U.S.
interests: in essence claiming the United
States may decide unilaterally to pre-
emptively invade another country. This
policy applies not only to Iraq but also
to any state that helps put weapons of
mass destruction in the hands of terror-
ists. Indeed, in light of recent informa-
tion about North Korea's nuclear
weapons program, this could well be
the next point on the Axis of Evil to face
a preemptive war.
Conclusion
The issues remain timely and rele-
vant: must the president seek congres-
sional authorization to order preemptive
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invasions of rogue states that may deliver
weapons and aid to terrorists? What is
the correct scope and allocation of war
powers for preemptive invasions? House
joint Resolution 114 did not answer or
reduce the urgency of these questions.
Both history and the Constitution itself
show that the president is not free to
change the constitutionally mandated
allocation of war powers.
Mark R. Shulman is an associate at
Debevoise & Plimpton and a lecturer at
Columbia University School of Law.
Lawrence]. Lee is a student at New York
University School of Law. The authors
acknowledge with gratitude the advice
of Daniel Reich in writing this article.
Omarska Camp,
Bosnia
continued from page 14
functioning more efficient or effective,
or performing acts that advance the
goals of the criminal enterprise.
Persecution and Sexual Violence
Notably, the Chamber also stressed
that any who knowingly participate in a
significant way in a criminal enterprise
are responsible not only for all crimes
committed in furtherance of the enter-
prise but also for all crimes that were
natural or foreseeable consequences of
the enterprise, even if these other
crimes are incidental or unplanned.
Consequently, even though there was
not evidence to suggest that most of the
accused were aware of the rape crimes
committed in Omarska camp, nonethe-
less these crimes were clearly foresee-
able, as the Trial Chamber emphasized:
"it would be unrealistic and contrary to
all rational logic to expect that none of
the women held in Omarska, placed in
circumstances rendering them especial-
ly vulnerable, would be subjected to
rape or other forms of sexual violence."
The Trial Chamber recognized that
war creates situations where average
citizens get caught up in the violence
or hatred, and people often commit
crimes they would ordinarily never
even have dreamed of committing.
Nonetheless, the Chamber empha-
sized, the presence of war or mass vio-
lence cannot shield or excuse perpe-
trators from prosecution if they know-
ingly participate in or facilitate crimi-
nal activity.
The Trial Chamber heard evidence
that each accused was present during
specific instances of abuses committed
in the camp, and it also heard evi-
dence that some of the accused occa-
sionally attempted to assist a few of the
detainees. Ultimately however, the
court concluded that each of the
accused had participated in a signifi-
cant way in the joint criminal enter-
prise that functioned as Omarska
camp, a camp where persecution of
non-Serbs through various forms of
physical, mental, and sexual violence
was rampant. The accused who had
not physically committed crimes had
showed up for-work everyday despite
the daily murders, tortures, beatings,
and other mistreatment and performed
the tasks assigned to them efficiently,
effectively, and without complaint.
They had facilitated the commission of
the crimes and allowed them to contin-
ue with ease and without disruption.
All five accused were convicted of per-
secution as a crime against humanity
for the assortment of evils committed
in Omarska camp.
As to the rape crime charges against
Radic, the Trial Chamber was convinced
that he was involved in "the sexual
harassment, humiliation, and violation
of women" in Omarska camp. Several
witnesses testified to his raping, attempt-
ing or threatening to rape, or groping
them. The Trial Chamber found that the
sexual violence constituted both rape
and torture. The women suffered severe
pain and suffering constituting torture,
in part because the "fear was pervasive
and the threat was always real that they
could be subjected to sexual violence at
the whim of Radic." Despite this find-
ing, because the indictment failed to
indicate whether the sexual violence
committed by Radic was different from
the rapes charged as part of the persecu-
tion count, they were deemed sub-
sumed by the persecution count; thus
he was not convicted of rape and tor-
ture for these crimes as crimes against
humanity. Radic was however convicted
of torture as a war crime for the sexual
violence he inflicted upon women in
Omarska camp.
Conclusion
The Omarska Camp case can be
used to demonstrate that even during
armed conflict, one cannot turn a blind
eye to blatant criminal activity; if you
know crimes are being committed and
you perform acts that facilitate the
commission of the crimes, you can be
held criminally responsible. It can also
be used to show that women are par-
ticularly vulnerable when detained in
facilities guarded by armed men of an
opposing side, and that all necessary
and reasonable measures must be
taken to provide protections against
sexual violence to such women. Any
planned or foreseeable crimes, includ-
ing rape crimes, committed during the
course of a joint criminal endeavor
cause liability to attach to participants
in the enterprise.
The degree of culpability, the
amount of time spent in the camp, the
position of the accused, and whether
the men convicted physically perpe-
trated crimes was taken into account in
sentencing. For the roles they played in
facilitating or committing the crimes,
Kvocka, Prcac, and Kos were given
five- to seven-year prison terms; Radic
received twenty years, and Zigic was
sentenced to twenty-five years' impris-
onment. This case is currently on
appeal before the ICTY Appeals
Chamber.
Kelly D. Askin is director of the Interna-
tional Criminal Justice Institute, has pub-
lished extensively in various areas of
international law and justice initiatives,
and served as a legal adviser-consultant
for many war crimes proceedings.
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